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The UK pensions landscape 
The main United Kingdom public service pension schemes cover health workers, teachers, 
civil servants, local government workers, the judiciary, the armed forces, police and 
firefighters. There are around 5 million active members of these schemes, and 12 million total 
scheme memberships, covering perhaps 1 in 5 UK citizens (Figure 1). Most scheme members 
are public sector employees, but there are also more than a million non-public sector workers, 
principally employees of contractors who have taken on local authority services and teachers 
in independent (privately-financed) schools.
2 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Public service pensions are largely independent from, and additional to, state pension 
provision. For instance, pensioner members of public service pension schemes are eligible for 
the flat-rate basic State Pension and for means-tested Pension Credit payments.  This is 
consistent with the UK’s historical pensions structure, with the state providing a foundation 
level of pension provision that is supplemented by private or occupational pensions.  One 
exception is that members of public service pension schemes, like members of other 
occupational defined benefit schemes in the private sector, are ‘contracted out’ from the State 
Second Pension.  This means that their national insurance contributions are reduced to take 





The terms of public service pension schemes vary significantly, depending on their historical 
evolution and the requirements of the professions they cover (Figure 2). The first civil service 
pensions were paid in the late 17
th century, and military pensions date back to 1874.
3  
Accrual rates, final salary structures and pension ages of 60 all date back to the 19
th and ea
20
th centuries, or even earl
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE – OR COULD BE ANNEX] 
The funding of public service pension schemes has long been a topic of discussion; for 
instance, Lord (Nicholas) Kaldor examined the question for the Treasury in the 1960s. Most 
public service schemes are unfunded.  Current pension contributions are treated as revenue, 









employers should reflect the future cost of the pensions for current active members.
4  Current 
pension payments are met by the Exchequer.  Figure 3 shows the flow of money in the four 
largest unfunded schemes in 2009-10. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The main funded public service pension scheme is the Local Government Pension Scheme, 
which includes 101 different funds across the UK.  The 79 English LGPS funds were 
estimated to have around £130 billion in assets in 2010, compared to around £180 billion in 
liabilities, resulting in a funding ratio of 72 per cent.
5 Because these funds are locally 
managed, their investment strategies and assumptions vary.  Total annual investment 
management costs in England and Wales were £296 million in 2009-10.
6 
Pensions in payment 
The number of pensioners in the five largest schemes
7 has increased by 27 per cent in the last 
decade, almost 700,000 additional pensioners as a result of increasing longevity and 
workforce trends.  Excluding lump sum payments, pension payments to pensioners and 
dependants from these schemes were over £21 billion in 2009-10 (Figure 4), an increase from 
£16 billion a decade earlier. 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The distribution of payments from these schemes is inevitably uneven. About 65 per cent of 
female pensioners, and 40 per cent of male pensioners, receive pensions below £6,000 per 
annum, collectively making up about a sixth of total pension payments.  About 1 in 10 male 
pensioners, and 1 in 50 female pensioners, receive pensions of more than £20,000 per annum.  
Pensions of this size or larger constitute about a quarter of the total amount of pension 
payments, but are received by only about five per cent of pensioners (Figure 5). 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Pension liabilities 
The accrued liabilities of public service pension schemes were estimated by the Government 
Actuary’s Department (GAD) at £770 billion in March 2008.  However, estimates of 












calculations assume a discount rate based on real AA corporate bond yields, 2.5% in 2008), 
which can lead to very different estimates of liabilities.
8 
It is better to look at projected benefit payments from public service schemes over the next 
five decades, as a proportion of GDP.  This measure can give a good sense of long-term 
affordability.  Figure 6 shows that, on this basis, benefit payments have increased 
significantly in the last decade, both as a result of increased retirements and reduced GDP 
(following the financial crisis).  Payments are expected to remain at about 1.8 per cent of 
GDP for the next decade before falling to around 1.4 per cent of GDP by 2059-60. In the 
medium term, most of these payments reflect accrued rights, but future accruals could be 
affected by reforms to the pensions systems. 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Private sector pension provision 
During much of the 20
th century there was substantial convergence in pensions provision 
between the private and public sectors.  This was particularly evident in the first half of the 
century among employers with large skilled or semi-skilled workforces. By the middle of the 
century the prevailing consensus was to satisfy demand for skilled labour by offering a steady 
job with good prospects featuring recruitment at an early age, training and career progression 
over a 40 to 50 year working life to be rewarded in substantial part by a retirement package 
offering a pension equivalent to about two thirds of final salary. 
As a result, there are many non-public service employer-sponsored defined benefit schemes 
in the UK.  The high point of private sector DB pensions was in the late 1960s, but there was 
an extended plateau of active DB membership that lasted into the 1990s. However, more 
recently active DB membership has declined significantly. Part of the gap has been covered 
by increasing membership of defined contribution schemes, but there has also been an overall 
reduction in employer-sponsored pension provision in the private sector, such that around 
two thirds now lack any such provision (Figure 7). 
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Concerns about the level of saving for retirement were addressed by a Pensions Commission 
chaired by Lord Turner, which published its final report in 2005. In response, the 
Government proposed the introduction of automatic enrolment to employer-sponsored 
schemes, with minimum levels of employer and employee contributions. These new schemes 
are likely to be predominantly DC, with NEST expected to provide low-cost DC pensions 
targeted at smaller employers and the low paid.  Implementation of automatic enrolment is 
planned to start from 2012. 
Differences in pension provision between the public and private sector do not have any direct 







public to the private sector, as well as create an impression that public servants are in some 
way privileged. 
Recent reforms to public service pensions 
The previous Government recognised the need for major reforms and began a modernisation 
programme for public service pensions when it took office in 1997. The first wave of reforms 
was generally focused on modernising outdated benefit designs.  The pension ages for new 
entrants were increased to 65 in the civil service, NHS and teachers’ schemes, while pension 
ages were changed to 65 for all members of the local government scheme (with some 
transitional protection for existing members).  Normal Pension Ages for new entrants to the 
police and armed forces were standardised at 55 (and 60 for new entrant firefighters), while 
the pension age for deferred members of these schemes was increased to 65. 
With the exception of the civil service scheme, all of the schemes retained their final salary 
structure. 
9 The civil service scheme instead move to a career average structure for new 
entrants. This was deemed to be more appropriate than final salary for an increasingly diverse 
civil service – one that wished to encourage movement to and from the private sector and to 
deliver equitable pension outcomes.  Figure 2 above documents some of the key changes 
across the schemes. 
The second wave of reforms introduced cap and share measures to share and limit pension 
costs. Under cap and share, increases or reductions in cost pressures identified at a pension 
scheme actuarial valuation are shared between employees and employers, up to the level of a 
cap. Above that cap, cost increases or reductions are borne entirely by employees, either by 
changing employee contributions or the cost of employee benefits (by measures such as 
changing pension ages), or by doing both. The current cost caps are set at around 14 per cent 
of pensionable pay in the teaching and NHS schemes, and 20 per cent in the civil service 
scheme. 
Cap and share is an untried system for sharing risks, and the arrangements are still in the 
developmental stage. Apparent limitations in the system include: 
•  the inability to pick up the considerable increases in the costs of providing pensions 
that have resulted from increases in longevity in recent decades; and 
•  the scheme-by-scheme basis of the system, which seems unlikely to produce coherent 
outcomes across government. 
The current Government has put forward significant reforms on top of these changes. In 
particular, it has changed the measure of indexation in public service pension schemes from 
the Retail Prices Index (RPI) to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI).  As a result of the CPI’s 







geometric weighting rather than arithmetic weighting), inflation on the CPI measure may on 
average be about three quarters of a percentage point lower than that on the RPI measure. 
This could have a significant effect on costs, reducing public service pension expenditure by 
over 10 per cent by 2030 and by 20 per cent by 2060. Figure 8 shows how the recent reforms 
and the change to CPI indexation might have reduced the effective employee benefit rates of 
pension schemes to public service employees, as a percentage of pay. The combined impact 
might be a 25 per cent reduction in the value of public service pensions to new scheme 
members compared to the value to old scheme members before the shift to CPI indexation. 
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Furthermore, in the light of the Independent Public Service Pensions Commission’s interim 
report, the Government announced that it would introduce staggered and progressive 
increases in the contribution rates of active members of public service schemes, of three 
percentage points on average. 
The Independent Public Service Pensions Commission 
It is in this landscape that the UK’s coalition government, elected in May 2010, invited Lord 
Hutton of Furness, the former Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, to chair a 
commission to conduct a fundamental structural review of public service pension provision. 
The government asked the IPSPC to make recommendations on pension arrangements “that 
are sustainable and affordable in the long term, fair to both the public service workforce and 
the taxpayer and consistent with the fiscal challenges ahead, while protecting accrued rights.” 
The IPSPC published its interim report on 7 October 2010, and its final report on 10 March 
2011. 
The principles of reform 
The IPSPC structured its analysis around four key principles, which were chosen to provide a 
balanced and comprehensive framework with which to consider the case for reform and 
against which to assess the options for long-term structural change. Public service pensions 
should be: 
•  Affordable and sustainable.  Public service pension expenditure must be affordable. 
To be sustainable, it must remain affordable over time. Affordability must be analysed 
in the context of overall government expenditure.  A reform that reduces the take-up 
of means-tested benefits such as Pension Credit, for instance by reducing the number 
of people opting out from pension provision, could have a substantial positive impact 
on long-term finances. This could not be calculated by looking at public service 
pension spending on its own.  In order to be sustainable, a scheme must be able to 
manage and share risks effectively, without dramatic increases in costs. 
•  Adequate and fair.  Public service pensions should provide an adequate level of 




•  Supporting productivity. Public service pension scheme design should support an 
efficient labour market for employees, and should look to aid the recruitment and 
retention of the right people in the right jobs in a cost-effective and flexible way. 
•  Transparent and simple.  Public service pensions should be widely understood.  
Scheme members need to know their entitlements and potential future benefits.  The 
population as a whole needs to be confident that public service pensions offer value 
for money.  Key design features and costs to employers and employees should thus be 
set out clearly and transparently.  Only with good general understanding is it possible 
to achieve the wide agreement that is central to reform. 
These principles formed the basis for the IPSPC’s assessment.  But there are important trade-
offs between them.  For example, some of the possible options to ensure long-term 
sustainability are relatively complex and therefore difficult to understand, contrary to the 
principle of transparency and simplicity. 
In light of these trade-offs, it is important to consider the purpose of public service pensions.  
This is not something that the British government has done before previous reforms; in its 
report on the 2007-08 reforms, the National Audit Office commented that the Treasury “did 
not make a clear statement about the purpose of public service pensions and the types of 
employee behaviour it wished to encourage and support through them...”
10 
There are many possible reasons for public service employers to provide pension benefits to 
their employees.
11 Those that stand out are centred on adequacy and fairness and on 
supporting productivity. 
Adequacy and fairness 
At the core of occupational pension schemes is the aim of ensuring that income is adequate 
across an employee’s lifetime.  Since we typically assume that individuals display declining 
marginal utility of consumption, an individual’s lifetime welfare will usually be higher if 
consumption is smoothed over the life cycle.
12 Given that people’s earning capacities are 
typically lower in later life, this can be a strong motivation for providing pensions. 
It could be argued that individuals should just be left to make their own arrangements to 
smooth income in retirement.  But there is strong evidence that people might then make 












resources in later life,
13 or to wider society, for instance because of a reliance on means-
tested benefits.
14 There are thus good reasons for governments to promote consumption 
smoothing through pension
Insurance is a further central motivation for pensions. By providing constant pension 
payments throughout an employee’s lifetime, government can help to insure against the risk 
of low incomes for those who live for longer than they had expected.  Public service pension 
schemes also provide an element of family insurance through survivors’ pensions and death 
in service benefits (partially insuring family members against the risk of the death of the 
pension holder). 
Governments could also have an interest in promoting poverty relief and redistribution 
towards the worse off through public service pensions, though the state pension system is of 
most importance in this respect. Under current public service pension scheme and UK state 
pension system designs, about 1 in 8 of public sector pensioners with at least 20 years’ 
service could expect to be eligible for means-tested Pension Credit payments at some stage in 
their lives.
15 In these circumstances, the true fiscal cost of providing pensions to the low paid 
might be relatively low, because the occupational pension in part replaces other income from 
the state.  However, there are other ways of achieving poverty relief and redistribution within 
the overall pension system, so these are not central motivations for occupational pensions.  
Supporting productivity 
Pension schemes could help public service employers to recruit and retain effective 
employees. In principle, providing remuneration through pensions could be more cost-
effective than doing so through pay, for the following reasons:
16 
•  Selection.  Because pension schemes do not provide remuneration until late in life, 
they might attract particular kinds of employee – those who value the future more 
highly, work more effectively, and are less likely to leave their jobs.
17  This could 
make it relatively cheaper to provide remuneration through pensions instead of pay.  
This reason could be most important for society as a whole where the employer 
provides substantial training, as in the National Health Service and armed forces – by 
hiring people who are likely to stay for several years, the employer will it easier to 















•  Motivation.  Pensions could play a role in encouraging employees to work hard.  For 
instance, the presence of an adequate and secure pensions guarantee could support 
employee engagement and commitment to their employers.
18 
•  Risk transfer. If employees value the risk transfer implicit in many pension schemes, 
they might be prepared to receive lower total remuneration in return.  For instance, 
employees might prefer not to bear the risk of variation in the price of annuities at 
retirement (and so variation in retirement income).  Most defined benefit schemes 
transfer this risk to the employer. 
These are potentially important impacts.  However, a downside of providing remuneration 
through pensions is that pensions lack the flexibility and responsiveness to circumstances that 
pay can provide.  For instance, an employer who finds that a particular set of skills is in high 
demand can increase pay for people with those skills, or offer retention bonuses to current 
employees.  It is much harder to target pensions in a similar fashion. 
Moreover, there is evidence that the valuation of pension entitlements by employees is lower 
than their cost to public service employers, suggesting that pensions will often not be as cost-
effective in recruiting and retaining employees as other aspects of remuneration.
19  Pension 
design should also guard against perverse effects, such as a reduction in labour market 
mobility that could harm productivity in the wider economy. 
Overall, the IPSPC concluded that public service employers have historically used pensions 
excessively for workforce management, for instance to encourage the departure of older 
employees.  This is a task for which pensions are not very well suited, and in which they are 
unlikely to provide value for money.  Public service pensions should continue to be a 
valuable part of the reward package, helping to attract and motivate high-quality employees.  
But the IPSPC argued that their primary purpose should be to ensure adequate levels of 
retirement income for public service pensioners. 
The Commission’s recommendations 
The IPSPC’s recommendations are summarised in Figure 9.
20  The IPSPC argued that, if 
accepted, its recommendations would deliver a fair and sustainable pensions deal for both 
public service workers and taxpayers. 
[FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
Accrued pension rights should be protected.  This is a prerequisite for reform both to build 
trust and confidence and to protect current workers from a sudden change in their pension 









maintained for current members, so that pension benefits continue to be based on the 
member’s final salary in public service. 
Scheme design 
But the IPSPC decided that final salary pension schemes were no longer appropriate for 
future accruals by public service employees.  The Government should continue to provide a 
form of defined benefit pension as the core design, but a career average revalued earnings 
(CARE) scheme would be fairer and would produce a better distribution of risks. 
In order to analyse the potential impact of different pension scheme designs, the IPSPC asked 
the Pensions Policy Institute to define the parameters for a set of alternative scheme 
structures in order that they would, on average, provide the same value of benefits to the 
scheme membership as a proxy final salary scheme (broadly intended to replicate a typical 
current UK public sector pension scheme).  This would enable assessment of the 
distributional effects of alternative structures.
21  The scheme parameters that resulted are 
shown in Figure 10. 
[FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
The Commission then applied these parameters to data from the Department for Work and 
Pensions’s Pensim2 model.
22  Pensim2 is a dynamic microsimulation model which aims to 
estimate the future distribution of pensioner incomes.  It is based on data sources including 
the Lifetime Labour Market Database (a one per cent survey of national insurance and 
taxation administrative data), the Family Resources Survey and the British Household Panel 
Study. 
The IPSPC’s analysis showed that all of these main scheme designs would be largely 
successful in achieving adequacy targets for those individuals with at least 20 years of public 
service employment.  Almost 95 per cent are expected to meet the level of pension income 
that Lord Turner’s Pensions Commission assessed to be a minimum level.
23  This result can 
provide some confidence that adequacy need not be harmed by a change in scheme design, 
but it does not allow us to differentiate between the designs. 
[FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
Greater differentiation can be provided by looking at the effects on those with different career 
profiles, in particular so-called ‘high flyers,’ employees with rapid promotions, and ‘low 
flyers,’ employees who have little or no real salary growth until retirement.  The IPSPC’s 
interim report showed that, in final salary schemes, high flyers could receive almost twice as 
much in pension payments per pound of employee contribution than do low flyers, implying 










This analysis is reinforced by the Pensions Policy Institute’s work, which shows that effective 
employee benefit rates are much higher for high flyers than for low flyers in their proxy final 
salary scheme (see Figure 12).  Results from the Pensim2 model suggest that 63 per cent of 
employees could be expected to receive higher pensions through a switch to an equivalent-
cost CARE scheme revalued by average earnings.
24  In addition, evidence on life expectancy 
suggests that high flyers can expect to live for longer and therefore receive pension payments 
over a longer period. 
[FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
The unfairness of final salary schemes is a key reason for the IPSPC’s recommendation that 
they should be replaced by new career average arrangements.  A further important problem is 
the distribution of risks within final salary schemes.  If employees experience rapid salary 
growth, this can have a large impact on their expected pension entitlements, since past service 
is revalued according to current salary developments.  This risk can be very costly to the 
employer.  Conversely, a period of low salary growth can be disproportionately beneficial to 
the government’s finances.  The IPSPC recommended that this type of risk should be shared 
with scheme members, as in CARE scheme designs. 
Indexation 
There are of course many different CARE scheme designs.  The choice of accrual rates and 
indexation will determine the future costs of public service pensions and their ability to 
provide adequate retirement incomes.  Accrual rates are central to affordability, and the 
IPSPC therefore did not make any recommendations here, believing them to be a decision for 
the government. 
But the IPSPC did make recommendations about the future indexation of public service 
pensions.
25  Before retirement, it recommended that the accrued benefits of current 
employees should be revalued in line with national average earnings.  This will mean that, for 
a typical scheme member, benefits will increase at approximately the same pace as their 
salary, with the result that the proportion of salary accrued at different ages will remain 
roughly equal (Figure 13).  This should support fairness and encourage participation in 
pensions among the young. 
[FIGURE 13 ABOUT HERE] 
For pensioner members, the IPSPC recommended indexation in line with prices.  This will 
ensure that pensions broadly maintain their purchasing power during retirement.  Finally, for 
deferred scheme members, the IPSPC felt that there could be a trade-off between ensuring 
adequacy and supporting labour mobility (which could suggest indexation by average 









of indexation for deferred members).  The choice should depend on the Government’s 
assessment of the role of public service pensions and the balance between different principles. 
Managing future risks 
The government has historically borne the costs of changes in life expectancy among public 
service pension scheme members.  Life expectancy in the developed world has continued to 
increase rapidly in the last five decades, against the predictions of most experts (Figure 14).  
This has been driven largely by rising life expectancy among those aged 60 or over, resulting 
in large rises in the costs of paying out pensions.  A member of the National Health Service 
Pension Scheme retiring now at the age of 60 could expect to spend 40 to 45 per cent of their 
adult life in retirement, compared with around 30 per cent for pensioners in the 1950s. 
[FIGURE 14 ABOUT HERE] 
The IPSPC’s view was that it is fair for members to bear the risk of rising longevity before 
retirement, but it is more difficult for those who have already retired to bear this risk (since 
they will be less able to adjust their plans).  The IPSPC therefore recommended that the 
Normal Pension Age (NPA) in most public service pension schemes should in future be 
linked to the UK State Pension Age (the age from which people can begin to draw their State 
Pension).  In recognition of the unique characteristics of the work involved, the IPSPC 
recommended that the NPA should be 60 for the uniformed services (armed forces, police 
and fire). 
The State Pension Age is currently 65 for men and just over 60 for women.  It is scheduled to 
be equalised for men and women at 65 by 2018, and then to increase gradually over the next 
thirty years, such that the State Pension Age for someone born in or after May 1978 is 68.
26  
By linking scheme NPAs to the State Pension Age, it should thus be possible to create a 
sustainable pension system that manages longevity risk.  Scheme members would be able to 
begin to draw their pensions before this age, but the pension amounts would be actuarially 
reduced to take this into account.  Were the link to be adopted, the expected proportion of 
adult life spent in retirement could be expected to remain at about a third over the coming 
decades (Figure 15) 
[FIGURE 15 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition to linking scheme NPAs to the State Pension Age, the IPSPC thought that there 
should be an additional safety valve to ensure that public service pensions remain affordable 
and sustainable.  It recommended that the Government should set out a ‘fixed cost ceiling’: 
the proportion of pensionable pay contributed by employers to employees’ pensions over the 
long term.  If this is exceeded, there should be a consultation process to bring costs back 
within the ceiling, and an automatic default change if agreement cannot be reached.  The 









allowed for in the cost ceiling.
27  The cap and share arrangements currently in place in 
several schemes do allow for past service costs to be incorporated, but others have argued 
that those costs associated with the increased longevity of deferred and pensioner members 
should be borne by employers.
Governance and transparency 
There is currently a lack of readily available and relevant data about UK public service 
pension schemes, as well as inconsistent standards of governance across the schemes.  It is 
therefore difficult for scheme members, taxpayers and researchers to be confident that 
schemes are being run effectively and efficiently. 
Only one unfunded scheme, the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme, has a formal 
pension board, responsible for managing the scheme in accordance with its governing 
legislation and rules and for the stewardship of the resources it consumes.  The funded Local 
Government Pension Scheme (LGPS) has a range of local pension committees, but these do 
not have the legal status of trusts.  At present, their fiduciary duty is to taxpayers rather than 
to members and other beneficiaries. 
This position contrasts with the UK’s trust-based funded schemes in the private and public 
sectors, which are required to have a board of trustees, usually consisting of a fixed number 
of members (management, nominees of employees and pensioners, and independents). 
The IPSPC thought that, while there are valid reasons for the differences between the private 
and public sectors, lessons can be learned from the trustee model.  It recommended that every 
public service pension scheme (and individual LGPS Fund) should have a properly 
constituted, trained and competent Pension Board, with member nominees.  The Board would 
be responsible for meeting good standards of governance, including effective and efficient 
administration. 
In terms of transparency, the IPSPC recommended the regular issuance of benefit statements 
to members, and the publication of data that would allow simple comparisons to be made 
across government, between schemes and between individual LGPS Funds.  It also 
recommended that the Office for Budget Responsibility, established in 2010, should publish a 
regular analysis of the long-term fiscal impact of the main public service pension schemes. 
Summary 
Public service pensions are a crucial part of the UK pensions landscape.  But they face major 
challenges.  Rising life expectancy has dramatically increased the costs of traditional final 
salary pension schemes with retirement ages of 60 or below, while the unfairness of these 









The Independent Public Service Pensions Commission, headed by Lord Hutton, has 
recommended reforms aimed at enabling public service employees having access for the 
foreseeable future to good quality, sustainable and fair defined benefit pension schemes.  The 
Government has now stated that these recommendations will form a basis of consultation 
with public service employees and their representatives. 
By introducing new schemes in which accruals are based on career average earnings, the 
IPSPC aimed to enhance fairness, ending the inherent bias in final salary schemes against 
those public service employees whose pay stays low over their career.  By linking the Normal 
Pension Age to the State Pension Age, the costs of rising longevity are intended to be more 
equitably shared between employees and taxpayers.  By improving governance and 
transparency, the ambition is that scheme members and citizens will have confidence that 
public service pensions are well run and provide good value for money. 
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Pensioners Deferred members Active membersAccrual
Rate
Classic (pre October 2002) 60 1.5% 18.9% Final
Salary
1/80 3 x pension Closed
Premium 60 3.5% Final
Salary
1/60 By commutation Closed





1/43 By commutation Open






3 x pension Closed
Armed Forces Pension Scheme 2005 55 Nil Final
Salary
1/70 3 x pension Open
Police (England
and Wales)







Police Pension Scheme 2006 55 9.5% Final
Salary












1/80 3 x pension Closed












Local Government Pension Scheme
1997
65 5-6% 13.2% Final
Salary
1/80 3 x pension Closed
Local Government Pension Scheme 1
April 2008
65 5.5 – 7.5% Final
Salary
1/60 By commutation Open
Teachers (England
and Wales)
Teachers Pension Scheme Before
January 2007
60 6.4% 14.1% Final
Salary
1/80 3 x pension Closed
Teachers Pension Scheme 2007 65 6.4% Final
Salary





Lump Sum Status Employees
covered



























3.53 4.41 25 4,115 4,052 -2
NHS (England and
Wales)
3.13 4.62 47 6,951 7,234 4
Civil Service (UK) 2.97 3.67 23 5,626 6,199 10
Teachers (England
and Wales)
4.07 5.56 37 9,781 9,806 0
Armed Forces 2.4 3.08 28 7,160 7,722 8
Total 16.11 21.34 32 6,222 6,497 4
Total Pensions Paid Average (Mean) Pension
Source: National Audit Office, The Cost of Public Service Pensions, IPSPC analysis of resource accounts, Local
Government Financial Statistics England, 2010.
Note: Average pensions are calculated by dividing total pensions paid in the year by the number of pensions in payment at the end of the year. This typically























































































































































































Existing pensioners and deferreds Current employees - past service

































Public sector pension provisionRecent evolution of average effective employee benefit rates for the main schemes
Members of old
schemes –
Members of new schemes –










Source: Pensions Policy Institute.
Note: Based on the seven main public service pension schemes (NHS, teachers, LGPS, civil service, police, fire
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